Today's Edition
By Ayesha Khalfan Alremeithi*
The European troika states (France, Britain and Germany) are manoeuvring with the UN sanctions “snapback” mechanism against Iran in the final moments of the nuclear deal – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Signed in 2015 between the major powers and Iran, the gradual collapse of JCPOA began with the US withdrawing in 2018. This comes as the Western-Iranian rift widens following the 12-day war, with political pressures mounting on top of military ones against Iran and with the possibility of worsening economic conditions should UN sanctions return.
Such developments will affect Iran’s international relations and legitimise efforts to restrict it, including militarily. The “snapback” mechanism allows for the automatic re-imposition of sanctions by any state party to the nuclear deal within 30 days of receiving a notification from a participating state in the JCPOA if Iran breaches any of its obligations.
Iran has already accumulated over 400 kilogrammes of uranium enriched up to 60% purity, which could be enhanced to 90% – enough for nine nuclear weapons.
The European states argue that Iran has restricted the International Atomic Energy Agency’s ability to monitor and verify compliance with the deal. Diplomatic efforts at the negotiating table have yielded no results, while Iran’s nuclear programme continues to pose a clear threat to international peace and security.
The Europeans emphasise that there is no civilian justification for Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium. They seek to use the 30-day window before activating “snapback” to pursue dialogue with Tehran, but if that fails, sanctions will target Iran’s financial, oil, and defence sectors. The alternative would be renewed negotiations, yet Iran demands equal, indirect talks with the US and insists on its right to enrichment, rejecting concessions it views as compromising its sovereignty.
Behind the European push to restore sanctions stands the United States, supportive despite no longer being a JCPOA signatory. This differs from Washington’s failed attempt in 2020 to trigger “snapback”. This time, the US is working with the European troika to reinstate international restrictions on Iran, especially since Iran’s nuclear programme has drifted beyond international oversight after Israeli and US military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.
These strikes targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities to dismantle the programme. Nevertheless, such moves do not necessarily mean that the door to negotiations has been closed; rather, they may push or even compel Iran to return to the negotiating table without preconditions.
However, some factors may complicate the path to reinstating UN sanctions, including the expiration date for snapback being near - October 18, marking the end of the JCPOA’s timeline. After that, sanctions could be blocked by a Russian or Chinese veto. Moscow and Beijing may also employ delaying tactics until the deal expires, such as tabling a UN Security Council resolution calling on JCPOA parties to negotiate instead of imposing punitive measures. The feasibility of this depends on the broader dynamics of Western–Russian–Chinese relations, including frictions over Ukraine.
UN sanctions on Iran first began in 2006 over its nuclear programme. There were bans on exporting/importing uranium enrichment materials and missile-related technologies, restrictions on conventional arms, asset freezes on individuals/entities linked to the nuclear programme or the IRGC, exclusion of Iranian banks from the global financial system, monitoring of Iranian shipping and travel bans on certain officials.
The reactivation of the nuclear agreement would further isolate Iran on the international stage. For this reason, Tehran seeks to avoid such a scenario and is brandishing the option of withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a pressure card that could either strengthen its hand or complicate its position.
Such a move could trigger regional escalation and threaten maritime navigation while also giving Israel an opportunity to launch a new military operation against Iran. At the same time, it would deepen the country’s internal economic crisis and fuel divisions between reformists and conservatives.
Ultimately, Iran has few options. It could offer commitments that revive negotiations, such as restoring full IAEA oversight.
Tehran may also attempt to buy time through protracted negotiations or rely on Russian and Chinese support in the Security Council. Yet these paths are uncertain and may fail to prevent “snapback” before its expiration.
*The columnist is a researcher for the think-tank firm TRENDS Research & Advisory
