Imam Mohammad Tawhidi*
Somalia’s protracted conflict with Al-Shabaab remains one of the most enduring security threats in the Horn of Africa. As of 2026, the militant group continues to control swathes of territory in southern and central Somalia, launching attacks on government forces, African Union troops, and civilians. Al-Shabaab, formally known as Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, emerged in the mid-2000s as a radical offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which briefly seized power in 2006 amid Somalia’s civil war.
Rooted in jihadist ideology, the group pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2012, positioning itself as a key affiliate in the global jihadist network. Its operations include guerrilla warfare, suicide bombings, and extortion rackets, making it what US Africa Command (AFRICOM) describes as “the largest, wealthiest, and most lethal Al-Qaeda affiliate” in the world.
The group’s origins trace back to earlier Islamist movements in Somalia, such as Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), which peaked in the 1990s after the fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. AIAI, funded in part by Osama bin Laden, splintered into factions, with hardliners joining the ICU and later forming Al-Shabaab’s core.
Today, Al-Shabaab exploits Somalia’s weak governance, clan divisions, and poverty to recruit fighters, often forcibly, and maintain control over key areas. It funds operations through taxation on businesses, smuggling networks with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and control of ports and checkpoints.
Al-Shabaab’s ideology aligns closely with Al-Qaeda’s global jihadism, while intersecting with elements of Muslim Brotherhood–influenced political Islam within Somalia’s broader Islamist landscape.
In Somalia, Brotherhood ideas on governance and social organisation resonate in urban areas, aiding Al-Shabaab’s recruitment among disaffected youth frustrated with corruption and poor governance.
More directly, political factions linked to the Brotherhood have held power in Mogadishu since 2009. For instance, the Aala Sheekh and Damul Jadiid (“New Blood”) groups, both MB offshoots, have influenced successive administrations. Presidents like Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (2009–2012) and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (2012–2017, and re-elected in 2022) hail from these circles. Critics argue this has allowed Islamist networks to embed in government, potentially weakening counterterrorism efforts against Al-Shabaab.
The United Arab Emirates, which rightfully designated the MB a terrorist organisation in 2014, sees it as a threat to national and international security; and has opposed MB-linked groups across the region, including in Somalia.
A key economic angle involves Hormuud Telecom, Somalia’s largest telecommunications provider. Founded in 2002, Hormuud dominates mobile money services like EVC Plus, crucial in a cash-strapped economy. However, a 2012 UN Security Council report accused Hormuud of being “one of the single largest financiers of Al-Shabaab,” alleging lump-sum payments in hundreds of thousands of dollars, provision of communication networks to leaders like Hassan al-Turki, and logistical support including weapons and fighters. The report linked Hormuud’s founder, Ali Ahmed Nur Jim’ale, to the former Somali Council of Islamic Courts and claimed the company facilitated Al-Shabaab’s operations.
Addressing Somalia’s Al-Shabaab problem requires disentangling these threads. Military efforts by the Somali National Army, AMISOM (now ATMIS), and US air strikes have degraded the group but not defeated it. Political reconciliation, clan mediation, and economic reforms are vital to undercut recruitment.
Ultimately, Somalia’s path forward lies in strengthening institutions to confront terrorism without exacerbating internal divisions. As the country grapples with drought, displacement, and deep governance failures, a holistic approach combining security, diplomacy, and development offers the best hope against Al-Shabaab’s enduring threat.
In this context, Somalia needs the United Arab Emirates and its proven experience in national security and state-building as a strategic partner, rather than risking vital opportunities through political uncertainty or short-term manoeuvring that could cost the country long-term stability.
*Parliamentary Adviser and research partner with TRENDS Research & Advisory